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ABSTRACT
People commonly make decisions and choices that could be delayed until a later time. 
This investigation examines two factors that may be especially important in these types 
of decisions: resource stability and comparison target. I propose that these two factors 
interact to affect whether individuals tend to adopt a delay strategy or whether they 
engage in more present-oriented strategy. Specifically, this thesis study tested whether 
picturing one’s ideal led to the adoption of a delay strategy to a greater extent when 
resources were stable and to a lesser extent when resources were unstable. Participants 
read a house-hunting scenario in which the market was stable or unstable, and either 
pictured their ideal house at the beginning of the task or did not. As expected, participants 
in the stable housing market were more willing to delay choosing a house, though the 
predicted interaction between resource stability and comparison target did not emerge. 
Contrary to the predictions, however, participants who pictured their ideal house were 
more willing to choose a house immediately and were more satisfied with the house they 
chose. Overall, these findings did not lend support to the main argument of this 
investigation that picturing one’s ideal would promote a delay strategy under stable 
resource conditions. The finding that participants preferred immediate choice after 
picturing their ideal may have interesting implications for persuasion and advertising.  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The Effect of Comparison Target and Resource Stability 
on Delay Strategies in Decision Making 
 In everyday life, individuals face endless choices and decisions–where to live, 
whom to date, what car to buy, and so on. Many of these decisions involve evaluating and 
choosing among various prospective options. This thesis study aims to examine how 
different comparison targets affect the decision process when individuals have the ability 
to delay their decision until a later time. Recently, researchers in judgment and decision 
making have criticized the dominant methodologies in use and have called for a more 
ecologically-valid approach (e.g., Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2002). This investigation argues that one limitation with much of the past literature is that 
it focuses on decisions that are restricted to a particular point in time, such as choosing 
immediately between two options. One way to take a more ecologically-valid approach 
would be to examine decision-making contexts that include dimensions of time and 
delay, where individuals can decide whether to choose something immediately or choose 
to wait. This investigation proposes and tests two factors–comparison target and resource 
stability–that may influence these types of decisions and whether individuals elect to 
delay. This is most applicable to settings where resources turnover with time, where new 
prospects become available as old ones go off the market. Potential mates find partners, 
and others become available. Job openings are filled, and others become open. As houses 
are sold, others come on the market when people die or move away.  
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 One factor that will influence this process and whether individuals choose to 
delay is how stable or unstable those resources are. With the types of resources that 
turnover, it may be advantageous for decision makers to delay their decision until a better 
house, better mate, or better job comes along. When resources are stable, adopting a 
delay strategy may be more beneficial because it allows the decision maker to acquire 
more resources and because better options may become available. Then again, better 
prospects may not come along, and deferring the decision runs the risk of losing out on 
those good opportunities for good. When resources are unstable, it may be less beneficial 
to adopt a delay strategy because of the possibility that there will be no resources, or no 
desirable resources, left later on. Individuals may be attuned to this logic and may 
respond accordingly to cues of resource stability or resource instability by becoming 
more willing to delay or less willing to delay, respectively.  
 Another factor that will tend to influence the decision process is the reference 
point, also referred to as comparison target, against which decision makers compare 
potential options. One reference point that should be especially salient and relevant in 
these decision settings is an individual’s ideal or goal. Using an ideal or goal as the 
primary reference point in the evaluation and selection among a set of prospective 
options may promote a future-focused, long-term decision strategy when the available 
options are clearly not as desirable as the ideal.  
 The consideration of reference points is especially important in the American 
cultural context because pervasive advertising provides people with idealized comparison 
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targets to use in their everyday decisions. For example, when a house hunter has her ideal 
home, or “dream home,” in mind when she assesses potential domiciles, she tends to 
focus on the features those houses have in common with her ideal and on the features her 
ideal home has that are absent in those houses. The salience of her dream home may lead 
to this house hunter showing greater persistence, focusing on the future, and being more 
willing to delay making an offer on a house when the available options are less than ideal.  
 Holding a salient ideal also has potential consequences for attention. When an 
ideal is salient, the decision maker looks to see if the available options are similar to that 
ideal and have the same features. When an option lacks the same features as the ideal, it 
becomes a glaring omission. It is a common saying among realtors that “kitchens sell 
houses.” Let’s say that this decision maker’s ideal house has a modern kitchen with 
stainless steel appliances, dark granite countertops, and a floor plan that incorporates the 
kitchen into the living space. When she looks at a house with a kitchen that has an open 
floor plan, stainless steel appliances, white tile countertops, and a wood floor, she tends 
to focus on the layout and appliances as important positives, tends to focus on the 
countertops as a notable negative, and directs less attention to the flooring. She also 
notices things about this house that cue longevity, such as the quality of building 
materials, and things about this house that may not be pertinent until many years later, 
such as the quality of the school district or resale value of houses in that neighborhood. In 
general, she remains willing to wait to make an offer until she finds the house that she 
really wants. In contrast, another house hunter may simply look at the available houses in 
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his price range. Instead of comparing houses to his ideal, he may compare each available 
option to one another in order to figure out which one is “best.” Compared to the house 
hunter picturing her ideal, this house hunter adopts a more present-oriented strategy, 
focuses on what is immediately available to him, and is less willing to wait to see what 
becomes available later. 
 This thesis examines two factors–resource conditions and comparison target–and 
their role in the decision-making process. First, I review past research on known decision 
strategies and their underlying comparison processes, contrasting them with using ideals 
as reference points and with adopting a delay strategy. Second, I consider how 
comparison processes direct attention and may impact the decision process. Third, I 
review the literature on how environmental factors impact decision making and consider, 
specifically, how analogous resource conditions may also impact the decision process. 
Fourth, I integrate the two factors of interest and contend that comparison target and 
resource conditions interact to influence decision making and whether or not individuals 
adopt a delay strategy. I propose that individuals who use their ideal or goal as their 
primary comparison point tend to adopt a more future-oriented, delay strategy than those 
who do not, and that stable environments tend to allow, if not promote, delay strategies, 
whereas scarce, unstable environments tend to constrain decision makers to use present-
oriented strategies. In addition, these two factors may interact to affect decision 
strategies, such that picturing one’s ideal when resources are stable promotes the use of a 
delay strategy, but picturing one’s ideal when resources are unstable does not promote a 
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delay strategy. This investigation tests these predictions by using an experimental 
methodology that manipulates resource conditions and comparison target.  
Known Decision Strategies Versus Prototype Matching and Delay Strategy  
 Considering two well-known, well-researched decision strategies–maximizing and 
satisficing–illustrates how decision strategies are often conceptualized, the importance of 
comparison processes, and also a gap in the literature that this thesis aims to address. 
Simon (1955, 1956, 1957) proposed the distinction between maximizing and satisficing 
as two different decision strategies that individuals may use when making choices. A 
decision maker using a maximizing strategy (a maximizer) seeks the best available 
outcome, often by comparing all available options to one another (Mills, Meltzer, & 
Clark, 1977) or by conducting an exhaustive search of all possibilities (Iyengar, Wells, & 
Schwartz, 2006). In contrast, an individual adopting a satisficing strategy (a satisficer) 
evaluates options until finding one that passes his or her minimum threshold of “good 
enough.” Another way of conceptualizing the difference between these two strategies is 
by the question that guides decision makers: When confronted with choices and 
evaluating options, maximizers are described as asking themselves “is this the best 
option?” whereas satisficers are described as asking themselves “is this a good 
option?” (Schwartz, Ward, Monsterosso, Lyubomirsky, White, & Lehman, 2002). The 
current investigation examines how the decision process is affected by individuals 
comparing options to their ideal and asking themselves “how close is this to what I 
want?” This thesis will herein refer to this comparison process as prototype matching.  
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 The distinction between these two decision strategies demonstrates the role of 
comparison processes in decision-making strategies; instead of comparing all possible 
options to each other as maximizers do, satisficers compare each option to the threshold 
of what they consider acceptable. This thesis considers how the use of a different 
comparison target in prototype matching–the decision maker’s ideal–influences the 
decision process. Unlike maximizing and similar to satisficing, the prototype-matching 
decision maker compares options to a single target. In contrast to satisficing, this 
comparison target is much more desirable and would tend to promote downward 
comparisons to choice options if, as is often the case in real life, the available options fall 
short of one’s ideal. Satisficing, in contrast, would promote either upward or downward 
comparisons to options, depending on which side of the “good enough” threshold they 
fall, and would promote, by definition, an upward comparison to a chosen option that 
falls above that threshold. 
 One dominant methodology for researching maximizing and satisficing decision 
strategies has been the development of individual-difference instruments to assess which 
decision strategy individuals predominantly use (e.g., Schwartz, Ward, Monsterosso, 
Lyubomirsky, White, & Lehman, 2002; Turner, Rim, Betz, & Nygren, 2012; Diab, 
Gillespie, & Highhouse, 2008). Of the paradigms that include actual decisions or choices, 
participants most often must choose immediately. In many ways this is not inappropriate; 
because maximizing focuses decision makers on what is currently available and directs 
them to the relatively best option, it could be considered a present-oriented decision 
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strategy. A more ecologically-valid approach, however, would take into account the 
dimension of time and ability of decision makers to delay. As Gigerenzer and colleagues 
emphasize in their model of ecological rationality, the ability of particular heuristics and 
decision strategies to enable good decision making depends on their fit with the particular 
environment (e.g., Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). In this case, 
there seems to be a fundamental mismatch between a maximizing strategy and 
environments in which a long-term strategy is advantageous. In contrast, prototype 
matching leads decision makers to focus on their ideals, which are often beyond what is 
currently available to them and only available sometime in the future. Because of this and 
because of an increased focus on future utility, prototype matching may promote a long-
term, delay strategy that would be better suited to these types of decisions that can be 
delayed or environments that benefit long-term strategies.  
 Though relatively few studies in the decision-making literature explicitly give 
participants the option to defer their decision until a later time, the findings of one study 
that did allow participants the option to delay illustrate the importance, and feasibility, of 
considering the temporal dimension of decision making and the ability of decision 
makers to delay. This study demonstrated that high conflict among available options 
increases the preference to delay making a choice (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Consider 
two goods that vary on two attributes, A and B. When one good is better on attribute A 
and the other good is better on attribute B, these goods are considered to be in conflict; 
one option is not clearly better than the other one. When one good is better on both A and 
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B than the other good, it is said that the better good is dominant. This is a simple but 
straightforward way to conceptualize conflict among sets of options. This research 
examined patterns of decision making across three different sets of options: (1) a good 
Sony CD player on sale and the option to delay and learn more about the products; (2) 
two options that were in conflict–a good Sony CD player on sale versus a more 
expensive, top-of-the-line Aiwa CD player on sale–and the option to delay; or (3) two 
options in which one was dominant–a good Sony CD player on sale versus a less 
attractive CD player–and the option to delay. Participants preferred to delay more 
frequently when there were multiple options in conflict (46%) than when there was one 
good option (34%) and when there were multiple options with one dominant option 
(24%). These findings illustrate the impact of being able to delay on decision making and 
support the call for a more ecologically-valid approach that takes into account 
individuals’ ability to delay making decisions, even for fairly mundane goods. 
Comparison Processes Direct Attention  
 Understanding how individuals make comparisons provides insight into how 
decision strategies influence what information individuals attend to and what information 
is influential in the decision process. This would implicate a mechanism through which 
prototype matching may influence the decision process. Models of comparison processes 
are especially relevant to these types of decisions and, importantly, lead to specific 
predictions about how particular decision strategies impact which features individuals 
tend to focus on and remember. The most relevant model of comparison, Tversky’s 
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feature matching model (1977), would predict that individuals who prototype match, who 
compare options to their ideal, tend to focus on shared features and on negative features 
of those options, especially features that exist in their ideal but not in the options.  
 The feature-matching model provides insight into comparison processes and can 
be used to make predictions about which features will be most impactful in decision 
processes. This model represents objects as collections of features and describes 
similarity between two objects as an increasing function of common features and a 
decreasing function of features that are not shared. In addition, the feature-matching 
model focuses on the direction of comparison and makes predictions about which 
features are going to be most salient when making similarity judgments. Individuals start 
with one comparison target, the subject, and look for the features of the subject in a 
second comparison target, the referent. When individuals see many of the features of the 
subject in the referent, it leads to judgments of high similarity. When individuals see few 
features of the subject in the referent, it leads to judgments of low similarity. Importantly, 
this perspective makes predictions about which features are going to be most salient: 
common features between subject and referent, and features present in the subject but 
absent in the referent. In addition, subsequent research indicates that the relatively more 
accessible, salient stimulus tends to be the subject of comparison (e.g., Agostinelli, 
Sherman, Fazio, & Hearst, 1986). When the feature-matching model of similarity 
judgments is applied to the current investigation, I would expect individuals’ ideals and 
goals to be the subject of comparison because of the high salience and great personal 
!9
importance of ideals. Individuals who focus on a particular ideal look for the features of 
the ideal in prospective options and may especially notice the features the options have in 
common with the ideal and the features present in the ideal but absent in the options.  
 In summary, when individuals use prototype matching, I predict the features that 
tend to become salient are (1) those shared by the ideal and the options, and (2) the 
features present in the ideal but absent in the options. Knowing which features are likely 
to be salient and impactful in the decision process enables predictions concerning which 
options individuals are likely to choose when using prototype matching–those options 
that have the most features in common with the ideal. This may be important because it 
suggests that features that are important and useful may not be given appropriate weight 
in the decision process if they are absent from the ideals that decision makers envision.  
Environmental Factors and Resource Stability 
 Environmental factors influence intertemporal decision making and may also 
influence decision strategies. Research from a life history perspective, for example, has 
shown that individuals from harsh, unstable environments during their childhoods tend to 
develop behavioral strategies indicative of a fast life history strategy, such as sexual 
activity at an earlier age and other present-oriented tendencies (e.g., Belsky, Schlomer, & 
Ellis, 2012; Daly & Wilson, 2005; Krueger, Reischl, & Zimmerman, 2008). Recent 
empirical research indicates that such present-oriented strategies, which include steep 
temporal discounting and preference for risk, emerge when those individuals are faced 
with mortality cues (Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson, 2011). Researchers from 
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this perspective, however, emphasize that in such environments these behavioral 
strategies may be adaptive, or may have been adaptive in ancestral environments. That is, 
these decision strategies should not be framed as irrational or maladaptive, as behavior 
indicative of steep temporal discounting often is in the literature. This thesis examines a 
proximate factor that may influence decision strategies in a way that is analogous to the 
influence of early childhood environments on life history strategies–resource instability 
and scarcity. In this context of this investigation, resources refer to the particular type of 
options or alternatives a decision maker can opt to pursue or choose, such as houses or 
romantic partners.  
 In general, resource instability likely promotes present-oriented decision 
strategies, whereas resource stability likely promotes the adoption of a delay strategy. In 
environments where resources are unstable, however, decision strategies may likely be 
constrained because of the real possibility of ending up with nothing. Though future-
oriented strategies that promote delay of decisions are often lauded and shown to be 
associated with positive outcomes, they may actually be less useful under conditions of 
resource instability and increase the likelihood of a decision maker coming up empty 
handed. In environments where resources are stable or plentiful, however, a wider range 
of decision strategies are feasible because these environments often do not pose the 
danger of ending up with nothing. When resources are stable, individuals have more 
latitude to adopt either a present-oriented strategy or a future-oriented strategy. In 
addition, individuals’ decision strategies may be more variable and more malleable in 
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these types of environments because a wider range of decision strategies can feasibly lead 
to an acceptable outcome. 
 Following that line of reasoning, this thesis proposes that comparison target and 
resource conditions interact to affect the decision process. Though prototype matching 
may generally lead to the adoption of a delay strategy, resource conditions may qualify 
this effect such that the magnitude of the effect is greater when resources are stable and 
that the magnitude of the effect is diminished when resources are unstable. That is, 
resource instability may constrain the emergence of delay strategies and promote short-
term strategies such that when individuals picture their ideal, delay strategies may not 
emerge to the same extent that they would under resource stability. This predicted 
interactive effect stands in contrast to the possibility of additive effects of the two factors. 
If we were expecting additive effects, the difference between control and prototype 
matching would be the same in both resource conditions, though we would expect them 
both to be lower under resource instability. In contrast, this investigation asserts that the 
difference between control and prototype matching in the willingness to adopt a delay 
strategy will be greater under resource instability because individuals are sensitive to the 
greater risk associated with delay in unstable environments.  
Outcomes and Predictions 
 This thesis contends that comparison targets and resource conditions influence the 
decision process and whether individuals adopt a delay strategy or a more present-
oriented strategy. Up to this point, terms like short-term, present-oriented strategy and 
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future-oriented, delay strategy have been used broadly to encompass several 
conceptually-related but distinct tendencies. I conceptualize a presented-oriented strategy 
as consisting of a increased preference for immediate choice, decreased preference for 
delayed choice, a general present-focus, and steeper temporal discounting. Conversely, I 
conceptualize a delay strategy as consisting a decreased preference for immediate choice, 
increased preference for delayed choice, a general future focus, and less steep temporal 
discounting. Because the measures of future orientation, present orientation, and decision 
timing were all situated within the context of the study and conceptually similar, I discuss 
my predictions for these measures together. Because this study employed a domain-
general temporal discounting measure, I discuss my predictions for this measure 
separately.  
 Temporal Orientation and Decision Timing. I predict that prototype matching 
tends to engender a broad future focus, increased preference for delayed choice, and 
decreased preference for immediate choice. When individuals consider their ideals and 
goals, they are most often considering their future, what they are striving for, or what 
they hope to achieve. Prototype matching may also highlight better potential options that 
could be available at a later time. Even if they do not already have a clear goal or ideal in 
mind, thinking about what their goals or ideals might be is likely to shift their temporal 
focus to their future, as they dwell on what could be better than it is right now. 
Characteristics that connote future utility–durability, longevity of usefulness, and future 
monetary value–may become especially salient and impactful in decision making in this 
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future-oriented mindset. In contrast, I expect that resource instability leads to focusing on 
the present, increased preference for immediate choice, and decreased preference for 
delayed choice because of the uncertainty concerning what will actually be available in 
the future. These present-focused individuals, on the other hand, should place additional 
importance on features that signal immediate usefulness, fulfill short-term goals, or 
satisfy current needs. Further, I predict these two factors interact such that picturing one’s 
ideal may lead to a delay strategy to a greater extent when resources are stable than when 
they are unstable.  
 Temporal Discounting. I predict that use of ideals or goals as the primary 
comparison target may have domain-general effects, in addition to impacting aspects of 
the immediate decision process. Specifically, having a salient, vivid goal or ideal may 
function in the same way as holding a vivid mental representation of one’s future self, 
which is associated with less steep of temporal discounting. A recent perspective, the 
future self-continuity model, proposes that perceptions of the future self in relation to the 
current self is a strong predictor of intertemporal decision making, such that perceiving 
the future self as similar and connected to the current self, picturing the future self 
vividly, and holding a positive view of the future self reduce temporal discounting 
(Hershfield, 2011; Ersner-Hershfield, Garton, Ballard, Samanez-Larkin, & Knutson, 
2009). Experimental procedures that increased vividness of the future self, either through 
an immersive virtual reality environment or by morphing participants’ photos to appear as 
their older self, exhibited greater monetary saving behavior (Hershfield, Goldstein, 
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Sharpe, Fox, Yeykelis, Carstensen, & Bailenson, 2011). People’s ideals and goals are 
often part of their mental representation of the future. Important ideals and goals may 
also be key, if not fundamental, aspects of how individuals see themselves. Thus, it is 
reasonable to predict that having a vivid mental representation of one’s ideals or goals 
may have similar consequences as having a vivid mental representation of one’s future 
self, especially when those ideals or goals are important parts of the self concept. 
Following this line of reasoning, prototype matching may likely result in less steep 
temporal discounting, in placing greater weight on the future. Resource instability, on the 
other hand, may lead to steeper discounting because it makes salient present utility and 
casts a veil of uncertainty around possible future utility. These two factors may interact in 
a similar way as I predict the other outcomes will; prototype matching may only lead to 
less steep discounting under stable resource conditions, whereas it may not have as much 
of an effect on discounting when resources are unstable.  
 Choice. I predict that comparison target influences the salient features in the 
options, which in turn impacts choice. Specifically, I expect that prototype matching 
would lead individuals to prefer options that have many shared features with their ideal, 
especially concrete features that are easy to compare. This may seem very intuitive, but it 
suggests that useful, important features may not be sufficiently attended to if they are not 
contained in the decision maker’s ideal. 
 Post-Choice Satisfaction. I would expect, reasonably, that most available options 
fall short of individuals’ ideals. Because of this, I predict that prototype matching 
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typically involves a downward comparison from the ideal to the options, which would 
tend to lead to diminished satisfaction with the chosen option. 
Current Investigation 
Overview  
 This study examined how comparison target and environmental factors may 
interact to affect decision processes. Participants imagined that they were house hunting. 
House hunting is a domain in which delay (how long you spend looking at houses) and 
resource stability (how often new houses are coming on the market) are crucial to 
consider when making a decision. New houses may come on the market, and these new 
houses may be better than what is already on the market, so there are times when it is 
highly advantageous for house hunters to delay making an offer.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were current undergraduate students at a large Southwestern 
university who were recruited via the undergraduate psychology participant pool. The 
study included a catch question that prompted participants to provide a specific answer 
(If you are reading this question, answer ‘Not at all like me.’). The final sample included 
the 259 participants (84.9% of total, 65.9% female, Mage = 19.39) who provided the 
correct answer to the catch question. 
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Study Design 
 This study employed a 2x2 between-subjects design. The two independent 
variables were Market Information, which manipulated cues of resource stability, and 
Comparison Target, which manipulated the reference point against which participants 
would evaluate their options. Participants completed a decision-making scenario in which 
they were house hunting. To manipulate resource stability, participants read either that the 
housing market was stable (n = 132) or that it was a seller’s market (n = 127). To 
manipulate the salient reference point participants would use when evaluating prospective 
houses, they were told to picture and describe their ideal house (n = 132) or were given 
no special instructions (n = 127). Of the four possible conditions, seller’s market and 
control comparison target had 61 participants, and the three other conditions had 66 
participants.  
Power Analysis 
 I conducted a prospective power analysis using G*Power 3.1 to determine the 
minimum sample size required for this study. To detect a medium effect (f = .25) with this 
study design at .8 power and α = .05, the minimum total sample size would be 128. Based 
on this, we would conclude that this study has sufficient power to detect medium-sized, 
or larger, effects. I conducted a retrospective sensitivity analysis to determine the effect 
size this study had the power to detect. According to G*Power 3.1, at .8 power, this study 
could detect an effect size of f = .18.  
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Procedure 
 Participants completed the study online. After reading the cover letter, they were 
given an overview of the house hunting task and some instructions. The Market 
Information manipulation was embedded in the instructions, and participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. Next, participants were randomly 
assigned one of two Comparison Target conditions. After the two manipulations, 
participants began house hunting by stating their general housing preferences concerning 
size and number of bedrooms, which were used to match them to a set of relatively small, 
medium, or large houses. Each of the three sets of two houses was identical with the 
exception of square footage and number of bedrooms. One house was slightly larger than 
the other house, and the other house had a slightly better kitchen. Participants were told 
they had been allocated $215,000, the current median house price in the United States 
(http://realestate.msn.com/2014-housing-outlook-home-prices-head-higher; http://
www.kiplinger.com/article/real-estate/T010-C000-S002-housing-outlook-2014.html), 
with which they could make an offer on one of the two houses.  
 Participants viewed and rated the two houses, indicated how willing they were to 
delay making an offer, indicted how willing they were to make an offer immediately, and 
then reported whether they wanted to make an offer immediately or to delay. Regardless 
of what they wanted to do, they were told that the two houses they saw were 
representative of the houses on the market and to choose one of them. After choosing a 
house, participants filled out post-choice satisfaction questions, evaluated potential 
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renovations that were either present-oriented or future-oriented, and completed a time 
preference measure. They also filled out ancillary measures, including self-reported use 
of various decision strategies and various demographic questions.  
Measures  
 Decision Timing. Three measures assessed when participants wanted to make 
their decision. On a 7-point scale, participants reported how willing they were to delay 
making an offer on a house and how willing they were to choose a house immediately. As 
expected, these two measures were negatively correlated, r (258) = -.36, p < .001. 
Although one could make an argument to combine these two items into a single measure, 
I drew on recent psychometric work that recommends separating consideration of the 
future and consideration of the present; despite being negatively related, these two 
constructs appear to have independent predictive qualities (Joireman, Balliet, Sprott, 
Spangenberg, & Schultz, 2008). In addition, research has distinguished among choice and 
non-choice as unique but not necessarily opposite psychological factors (Botti & Iyengar, 
2004). Conceptually, higher willingness to delay and lower willingness to choose 
immediately represent a long-term strategy, whereas the converse represents a short-term 
strategy. The third measure was a binary-choice measure–whether participants indicated 
that they wanted to delay making an offer or wanted to choose one of the two houses 
immediately.  
 Preference for Immediate or Delayed Utility. To assess preference for 
immediate versus delayed utility, this study included both domain-relevant measures, 
!19
which asked participants to rate potential renovations, and a domain-general time 
preference measure, which was adapted from an existing measure used in contemporary 
temporal discounting research (e.g., Weber, Johnson, Milch, Chang, Brodscholl, & 
Goldstein, 2007). We altered the certainty of the larger delayed reward from 100% to 
95% to limit the possibility of demand characteristics of the measure. Participants may 
have seen that we were testing whether the preferred a smaller amount now versus a 
larger amount later and, in turn, selected all the delayed choices.  
 Participants were asked to rate eight potential renovation options. Half of the 
options were future-oriented–they had cues of longevity and were less extensive 
renovations that used higher-quality materials–and the other half of the options were 
present-oriented–they lacked cues of longevity and were more extensive renovations that 
used mid-grade materials. The reliabilities of both the future-oriented items, Cronbach’s α 
= .58, Nitems = 4, and the present-oriented items, Cronbach’s α = .53, Nitems = 4, were 
acceptable, given the small number of items. I formed a composite of each of these two a 
priori groupings of items.  
 Participants completed a domain-general time preference measure adapted from a 
validated, existing measure (e.g., Weber, Johnson, Milch, Chang, Brodscholl, & 
Goldstein, 2007). Participants were told to imagine that they were going to be given a 
$50 Amazon.com gift card. They were given choices between accepting the gift card 
immediately or a 95% chance of receiving a larger gift card in three months, ranging 
from $50 to $100 in $5 increments, presented in a randomized order. That is, for each $5 
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increment between $50 and $100, participants choose whether they want to take the $50 
gift card now or have a 95% chance for a gift card of that amount, which would be 
received three months later. Participant responses were recoded to be on an 11-point 
scale, representing how many times they chose to take the gift card immediately. 
Conceptually, the more often participants take the $50 gift card immediately, the steeper 
the discounting and the greater the preference for immediate rewards. If participants 
indicated that they would take a 95% chance of a $50 gift card in three months over a $50 
gift card immediately, the response was omitted. If participants had more than one 
equivalence point–switching from immediate to delayed or from delayed to immediate–
the response was omitted because it was not codeable. That is, if a participant selected to 
received the $65 gift card immediately, the $70 gift card in three months, and the $75 gift 
card immediately, the response was not included.  
 Post-Choice Satisfaction. Participants answered five questions concerning how 
positively or negatively they viewed the house they chose and their satisfaction. These 
included three questions modeled after those that have been used in previous research 
(Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006): “How satisfied are you with the offer you have 
made?” “How much do you like the house you made an offer on?” and “How confident 
are you that you made the right choice about which house to make an offer on?” The two 
other questions were “How strong is your preference for this house?” and “How similar is 
this house to your ideal house?” All items were answered on a 7-point scale. These five 
items were combined into a single measure of post-choice satisfaction, α = .87, Nitems = 5. 
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 Socioeconomic Status. To assess subjective socioeconomic status (SES), we used 
eight items, adapted from past research (Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & Robertson, 
2011), that addressed past, present, and future SES: “My family usually had enough 
money for things when I was growing up,” “I grew up in a relatively wealthy 
neighborhood,” “I felt relatively wealthy compared to the other kids in my school,” “My 
family struggled financially when I was growing up (reverse-coded),” “I have enough 
money to buy things I want,” “I don't need to worry too much about paying my bills,” “I 
don't have to worry about money too much in the future,” and “I will be able to buy the 
things I need and want later in life,” Nitems = 8, Cronbach’s α = .83. Participants 
responded on a 7-point scale that ranged from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” 
For our measure of overall SES, we took the mean of these eight items. Across all eight 
items, there was only one participant who did not respond, leaving 258 participants for 
whom we calculated this measure. It should be noted that four of these items were 
explicitly about childhood and that the four other items addressed current and future 
monetary concerns. Internal reliability was also high for both the childhood SES items, 
Nitems = 4, Cronbach’s α = .80, and the combination of the three present-SES items and 
one future-SES item, Nitems = 4, Cronbach’s α = .79. 
Results 
Decision Timing 
 Willingness to Delay (see Figure 1). Market Condition and Comparison Target 
did not interact to affect willingness to delay, F(1, 255) = .79, p = .38, η2p = .003, and 
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there was no main effect of Comparison Target, F(1, 255) = .22, p = .64, η2p = .001. There 
was, however, a main effect of Market Condition, F(1, 255) = 8.23, p = .004, η2p = .031, 
such that participants in the stable market (M = 4.92, SD = 1.11) were more willing to 
delay than participants in the seller’s market (M = 4.51, SD = 1.22). 
 Willingness to Choose Immediately (see Figure 2). The two manipulated factors 
did not interact to affect willingness to choose a house immediately, F(1, 255) = 1.69, p = 
.20, η2p = .007, and there was no main effect of Market Condition, F(1, 255) = .06, p = .
80, η2p < .001. Relative to participants in the control condition (M = 4.64, SD = 1.25), 
participants who pictured their ideal were more willing to choose immediately (M = 5.08, 
SD = 1.18), F(1, 255) = 9.01, p = .003, η2p = .034.  
 Immediate Offer or Delay (see Figures 7-8). The market and target factors did 
not interact to affect whether participants chose to delay or make an offer immediately, β 
= -.60, SE = .55, Wald = 1.19, OR = .55, df = 1, p = .28. There were, however, main 
effects of both Market Condition, 𝜒2(1, N = 259) = 6.64, p = .01, and Comparison Target, 𝜒2(1, N = 259) = 8.44, p = .004. A greater proportion of participants chose the delayed 
option in the stable market (72.7%) than did participants in the seller’s market (57.5%; 
see Figure 7). The Comparison Target factor influenced decision making contrary to my 
prediction such that a greater proportion of participants in the control condition preferred 
the delayed option (74.0%) compared to those who pictured their ideal house (56.8%; see 
Figure 8). 
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Preference for Immediate or Delayed Utility (see Figures 3-5) 
 The two factors did not interact to affect ratings of future-oriented renovation 
options, ratings of present-oriented renovation options, or responses on the time 
preference measure (see Table 2). Similarly, there were no main effects of Market 
Condition or Comparison Target on these three measures.  
House Choice (See Figures 9-10) 
 I predicted that a greater proportion of participants who had pictured their ideal 
would prefer the house with the better kitchen (The Bishop House) to the bigger house 
(The Rose House). The two factors did not interact to affect house choice, β = .05, SE = .
51, Wald = .009, df = 1, OR = 1.05, p = .93, and there was no effect of Market Condition, 𝜒2(1, N = 259) = .80, p = .37 (see Figure 9). There was, as predicted, a marginally 
significant main effect of Comparison Target, 𝜒2(1, N = 259) = 3.52, p = .06, such that a 
greater proportion of participants who pictured their ideal house preferred the house with 
the better kitchen (63.5%) compared to participants in the control comparison condition 
(52.0%; see Figure 10). 
Post-Choice Satisfaction (see Figure 6) 
 I predicted a main effect of Comparison Target, such that participants who 
pictured their ideal would report lower post-choice satisfaction than participants in the 
control condition. Consistent with this, the two manipulated factors did not interact, F(1, 
255) = .38, p = .54, η2p = .001, and there was no main effect of Market Condition, F(1, 
255) = .20, p = .65, η2p = .001. There was, in the opposite of the predicted direction, a 
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main effect of Comparison Target, F(1, 255) = 9.58, p = .002, η2p = .036, such that 
participants who pictured their ideal house reported greater post-choice satisfaction (M = 
5.36, SD = .81) than did participants in the control condition (M = 5.02, SD = .93). 
Summary of Primary Analyses 
 Overall, the results provided mixed support for the primary predictions. The 
prediction that resource conditions and reference point would interact to affect decision 
making was not supported, for any measure in this study.  
 The prediction that resource stability would lead to more of a future-oriented 
delay strategy relative to resource instability received some support. For instance, 
participants were more willing to delay when the market was stable, and a greater 
proportion of participants chose to delay making an offer when the market was stable. 
This manipulation, however, did not affect the other measures in this study, as had been 
expected. 
 The prediction that prototype matching would promote a delay strategy did not 
receive support. Participants in the ideal condition did not differ from those in the control 
condition in terms of willingness to delay, future orientation, present orientation, or time 
preference. Contrary to my prediction, participants who pictured their ideal were more 
willing to make an offer immediately and a greater proportion of them chose to do so.  
 The ancillary predictions received mixed support, as well. Consistent with my 
prediction concerning which features prototype matching would make salient and the 
corresponding influence on choice, participants who pictured their ideal preferred a house 
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with a better kitchen to a bigger house. This may be because the single bad kitchen 
feature in the bigger house was more salient when participants pictured their ideal. Of 
particular surprise, however, was the finding that participants who pictured their ideal 
were more satisfied relative to control. In contrast, we had predicted that prototype 
matching would lead individuals to rate the house they chose more negatively due to 
upward comparison.  
Exploratory Analyses 
 From a life history perspective, childhood environment should have a profound 
effect on temporal psychological factors, such as temporal discounting, so it makes sense 
that it would impact the measures of interest in this study, as well. Past research has 
suggested that childhood SES is predictive of how participants respond to measures of 
risk preference and time preference after morality cues (Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & 
Robertson, 2011). As such, our exploratory analyses incorporated childhood SES into our 
measure of overall SES, which used items that focused on resources. These analyses 
examined the relation of overall SES to the primary dependent measures of interest and 
whether overall SES interacted with the experimental manipulations.  
 Overall SES and Willingness to Choose Immediately (see Figure 12 and Table 
5). Our analyses revealed a three-way interaction among overall SES, Target, and Market 
that affected willingness to choose immediately, β = -.55, t(250) = -2.02, p = .04. To 
examine this interaction more closely, we analyzed the two-way interaction of Market by 
Target and the main effects of Target and Market one standard deviation below the mean, 
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at the mean, and one standard deviation above the mean. Coefficients and significance 
tests for each effect at each level of SES are given in detail in Table 5. In addition, there 
was a significant two-way interaction between Market and SES, β = .43, t(250) = 2.25, p 
= .03, and interaction between Target and SES was nonsignificant, β = .23, t(250) = 1.20, 
p = .23.  
 One standard deviation below the mean, there was a significant interaction 
between Market and Target, β = .96, t(250) = 2.34, p = .02, and a main effect of Market, β 
= -.65, t(250) = -2.34, p = .02. The relation between overall SES and willingness to 
choose immediately was strongest for participants in the Stable Market and Control 
Target conditions. Of participants who were in the Control Target condition, lower SES 
participants were more willing to choose immediately in the Stable Market and less 
willing to choose immediately in the Seller’s Market. Of participants who were in the 
Ideal Target, lower SES participants showed the opposite pattern and were more willing 
to choose immediately in the Stable Market and less willing to choose immediately in the 
Seller’s Condition. This interaction qualified the main effect of condition, whereby lower 
SES participants were generally more willing to choose immediately in the Seller’s 
Market than in the Stable Market. The was not a significant main effect of Target, β = -.
08, t(250) = -.61, p = .54 
 At the mean, there was no interaction between Market and Target, β = .37, t(250) 
= 1.27, p = .21, no main effect of Target, β = .23, t(250) = 1.11, p = .27, and no main 
effect of Market, β = -.19, t(250) = -.92, p = .36. One standard deviation above the mean, 
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there was a marginally significant main effect of Target, β = .48, t(250) = 1.66, p = .099, 
such that higher SES participants showed a stronger preference to choose immediately in 
the Ideal Target condition compared to the Control Target condition. The main effect of 
Market was nonsignificant, β = .27, t(250) = .90, p = .37, as was the interaction between 
Market and Target, β = -.22, t(250) = -.54, p = .59. 
 Taken together, these findings suggest that the effects of comparison target and 
resource conditions differ by socioeconomic status. The differences are most pronounced 
for lower SES participants, who are the least willing to choose immediately when in a 
stable environment and not picturing their ideal. When they are in a seller’s market, 
picture their ideal, or both, they become more willing to choose immediately, a result 
which mirrors previous findings from Griskevicius and colleagues (2011). It could be the 
case that lower SES participants are less willing to act immediately, perhaps because 
scarce resources make salient the need to be cautious and deliberate, though they respond 
to cues in the environment by becoming more present oriented.  
 Overall SES and Time Preference (see Figure 11). Overall SES and Target 
interacted to affect time preference, β = -.59, t(216) = -1.88, p = .06. The effect of the 
comparison target manipulation on time preference differed by participants’ overall SES. 
Lower SES individuals exhibited steeper discounting when primed to think about their 
ideal than did individuals from a more affluent environment. Simple slope analyses 
indicated that Target was a significant predictor one standard deviation below the mean of 
overall SES, β = 1.02, t(216) = 2.14, p = .03, but not at the mean, β = .39, t(216) = 1.15, p 
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= .25, or one standard deviation above the mean, β = -.24, t(216) = -.51, p = .61. These 
analyses indicated that the effect of the Target condition differed by overall SES, such 
that lower SES participants discounted more after picturing their ideal than they did in the 
control condition, but average and higher SES participants did not. 
 Significant Associations Between SES and Primary Measures (see Table 4). 
Analyses indicated that overall SES was positively related to ratings of future 
renovations, r (257) = .28, p < .001; willingness to choose immediately, r (257) = .11, p = 
.08; and self-reported post-choice satisfaction, r (257) = .23, p < .001. It was negatively 
correlated with willingness to delay, r (257) = -.11, p = .08, and time preference, r (218) = 
-.16, p = .02. Overall SES was not significantly correlated with ratings of present-
oriented renovations, r (257) = -.04, p = .53, did not predict whether participants decided 
to choose immediately or delay, β = 1.54, OR = .82, Wald = 2.41, df = 1, p = .12, or 
which house participants chose, β = .36, OR = .99, Wald = .01, df = 1, p = .53. 
General Discussion 
 In this investigation, we tested how comparison target and environmental factors 
that cue resource availability or scarcity affect decision making processes, attention, 
utility preferences, and choice. We expected that comparing available options to an ideal 
would lead individuals to adopt a more future-oriented delay strategy when resources 
were stable, but that doing so would have less of an impact when resources were scarce. 
We reasoned that a salient ideal would generally promote a more future-oriented strategy, 
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but that this would not emerge in environments where implementing a delay strategy 
would be detrimental, such as when particular resources were scare or unstable.  
 Overall, the findings provided mixed support for these predictions. Although the 
two factors did not interact to affect decision strategies or utility preferences as predicted, 
other predictions were supported by these data. For instance, participants were more 
willing to delay when the market was stable, and a greater proportion of participants 
chose to delay making an offer when the market was stable. In addition, participants who 
pictured their ideal preferred a house with a better kitchen to a bigger house. This may be 
because the single bad kitchen feature in the bigger house was more salient when 
participants pictured their ideal. Of particular surprise, however, was the finding that 
participants who pictured their ideal reported higher post-choice satisfaction than did 
participants in the control condition. In contrast, we had predicted that picturing one’s 
ideal would lead individuals to rate the house they chose more negatively due to the 
downward comparison from ideal to chosen house.  
 One methodological issue that may have impacted the results of this study 
concerns aspects of the experimental design in which participants reported their 
preferences and were shown houses consistent with those preferences. In real life, the 
options available to us are not always desirable options, not always options that are 
consistent with our preferences. Giving participants house options that were consistent 
with their preferences on two major dimensions–size and number of bedrooms–may have 
had unintended and detrimental effects. Specifically, this may have removed much of the 
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incentive for delay that normally exists in more ecologically-valid environments. One 
common reason to delay while house hunting would be to wait for better options to come 
on the market, options that are more consistent with what you are looking for. The 
experimental design obviated this common and compelling reason to wait by providing 
desirable, preference-consistent options. Another good reason to delay making an offer in 
more ecologically-valid circumstances is to acquire more resources in order to obtain a 
better house. This powerful reason to delay was also absent from our design. These 
aspects of the design may have made adopting a long-term strategy less appealing and 
may limit the generalizability of these findings due to the lack of important features that 
would be present in more ecologically-valid settings. To address this limitation, one 
future direction of this research would be to implement a research design in which 
participants are presented with undesirable options, or options that at least fall short of 
their preferences. In addition, the study design could add more of an incentive to delay, 
such as greater resources at later time or a stronger assurance that better options would 
become available in the future. 
 A second issue with this study concerns the sample population we used–
undergraduate students at a large, public university. Characteristics of the sample 
population may have affected how participants responded to the scenario and the findings 
of this study. College students have a reputation for living in modest, if not humble, 
accommodations. Also, and perhaps more importantly, few individuals in this population 
have experience with purchasing a house. As a result, the house options that were given 
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to them may have sounded far more appealing than they were intended to. In fact, all the 
options they saw may have exceeded what they imagined their current ideal living 
conditions to be, which for many college students is to simply have their own room, let 
alone a three bedroom house, or even a five bedroom house. This is problematic because 
it affects the type of comparison participants would have been making. We had reasoned 
that picturing an ideal would lead individuals to take more of a long-term strategy 
because the comparison from their current options to their ideal would be an upward 
comparison and it would have likely been salient to them that they could obtain a better 
outcome if they delayed. Contrary to this, if the options presented to participants 
exceeded the ideal they pictured, they would have been making a downward comparison 
from the options available to their ideal, making the options available even more 
appealing, and likely eliminating any inclination to delay. This interpretation is consistent 
with the finding that participants in the ideal condition were more satisfied with the 
chosen house and were more willing to make an offer immediately. To address this issue, 
a possible future direction of this research would be to use a community sample (perhaps 
a PTA) or an MTurk sample in order to include more adults with house purchasing 
experience, and whose ideal houses are nicer than the ones presented to them in the study. 
Alternatively, if we wanted to continue using an undergraduate sample, we could make 
the task dingy apartment hunting instead of house hunting; this would be closer to the 
actual experience and accommodations of our sample.  
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 A third potential problem concerns aspects of the experimental design related to 
the comparison target manipulation or that may have affected the comparison target 
manipulation. It may have been problematic that participants read about the house 
hunting task and the budget that they would be allocated before they completed the 
comparison target manipulation; participants in the ideal comparison target condition 
may have pictured an appropriate ideal for the task at hand, and for the known budget not 
their ultimate ideal. Importantly, this imagined ideal may have an attainable ideal, given 
the resources they would have available to them, or closer to an attainable ideal than it 
would have been had they been instructed to picture their ideal house before reading 
about the house hunting task. The budget may have bounded what they pictured for their 
ideal. Because of this, what they pictured may have been similar to the options that were 
presented to them during the scenario. Instead of promoting downward comparison from 
the ideal to the option, the ideal comparison target may have actually made salient the 
consistency between the imagined (attainable) ideal and the options available to 
participants. Finally, the ideal comparison target manipulation may have done more than 
simply get people to think about their ideal house; it may have also primed participants to 
think about house hunting and what they might want more generally. That is, it may have 
helped participants prepare for the task and enabled them to be more decisive and 
confident in their choices, which may partially explain why those participants were more 
satisfied in the ideal comparison target condition contrary to what had been predicted. 
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 The findings from this study may have some interesting implications and 
applications. Perhaps most intriguing were the unexpected findings that participants who 
pictured their ideal house were more willing to choose immediately, preferred to choose 
immediately, and were more satisfied with the house they chose. When considered within 
the context of the study and the post-hoc criticisms of the study design, these findings 
may imply an important boundary condition; these findings may suggest that the 
consequences of picturing one’s ideal actually leads to greater impulsivity and present-
oriented decision making when that ideal feels attainable or near attainable. It remains an 
empirical question whether the attainability of an imagined ideal affects its influence on 
the decision process, though this may be a viable avenue for further investigation. This 
finding and proposed avenue of research would be highly relevant to advertisers and 
marketers. If making an immediately-attainable ideal salient leads to more present-
oriented choice and making a not-immediately-attainable ideal salient leads to preference 
to delay, it would have important implications for how advertisers and marketers frame 
their products to consumers.  
 Overall, this study does lend support to the prediction that stable resources, as 
opposed to unstable resources, promote preference for delayed choice. It also lends 
support to the prediction that picturing one’s ideal affects choice by influencing which 
features are salient. The null and unexpected findings, however, do suggest that this study 
could have been improved in several ways. The particular decision scenario in this study 
may have been more appropriate for an older audience, both because an older audience 
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would be more likely to be acquainted with house hunting and because there would likely 
be less of a contrast between current living conditions and the houses being evaluated, 
compared to the college sample that was used. There were improvements that could have 
been made to the manipulations. The market manipulations could have been more 
detailed, more parallel, and more explicit about the characteristics of each housing 
market; for instance, it was implied that there were fewer resources and greater scarcity 
in the seller’s market, though the prompt focused on competition among buyers and how 
fast houses were being sold. The ideal comparison condition, too, could have been 
improved by having participants complete it before they knew about the decision task and 
the parameters of the resources they would be given. Those changes could make it more 
likely that they would picture an ideal that would be far more grand than the options 
available to them, an ideal that would get them to think more to what could be available 
in the future. Future research could also more closely examine the role of childhood and 
current SES as a moderator of these decision processes. Our exploratory analyses found 
that this factor interacted with our manipulations in a way that appeared to be mostly 
consistent with life history theory. In sum, this study provided preliminary, mixed support 
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IV #1: MARKET CONDITION 
 To manipulate cues of resource stability or resource instability, participants were 
randomly to one of two housing markets: stable market or seller’s market. The general 
instructions that participants read contained this manipulation. 
 STABLE MARKET. Participants read the following instructions:  
In this scenario, imagine that you are shopping for a house. You will be given a budget of 
$215,000 and shown a selection of houses in your price range on which you can make an 
offer. The housing market is currently stable. There is balance between the number of 
people looking to buy a house and the number of people trying to sell their house. As a 
result, there is normal turnover of houses. Houses currently listed as on sale are being sold 
within a month or two, and new houses are regularly coming on the market.   
 SELLER’S MARKET. Participants read the following instructions: 
In this scenario, imagine that you are shopping for a house. You will be given a budget of 
$215,000 and shown a selection of houses in your price range on which you can make an 
offer. The housing market is currently in a “Seller’s Market.” For buyers, this means that 
there is competition for the houses currently on the market. As a result, house shoppers 
should consider the options that are available because houses currently listed as on sale are 
being sold within days of coming on the market.  
IV #2: COMPARISON TARGET 
 To manipulate comparison target, which may in turn influence decision strategy, 
participants were assigned to a control condition or were told to picture their ideal house. 
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 CONTROL CONDITION. On the screen after the instructions, participants read 
the following: “On the next screen, you will start house hunting. Please click the next 
button when you are ready to begin.” 
 IDEAL CONDITION. On the screen after the instructions, participants read the 
following: “Before you start looking at houses, take a minute and imagine your ideal 
house. Think about what it looks like. Think about what features are important to 
you. Take a minute and picture this house and what it feels like to live there.” Second, 
participants read “Tell us a few details about the house you imagined that were 
particularly vivid.” and provided a written response. Third, participants were able to 
check boxes indicating which features were in the kitchen they imagined. These features 
included what the refrigerator looked like, what the counters looked like, what the 






 Participants were asked to indicate their preference for house size. They chose 
between three options: 3 or fewer bedrooms and less than 1500 sq. ft., 4 bedrooms and 
15-2500 sq. ft., and 5 or more bedrooms and more than 2500 sq. ft.; this choice affected 
the characteristics of the housing options they were presented with.  
SELECTING A HOUSE 
 After selecting their preferred size of house, participants read the following: 
“There are two houses listed below, each with some listing information. They are 
identified by the last names of their owners. When you make an offer, you will identify 
the house you want to bid on by the name of the house. Square footages have been 
rounded to the nearest -50 or -00.” Participants then rated each house for attractiveness 
on a seven-point Likert scale. 
 THE ROSE HOUSE. “This house is X square feet and has Y bedrooms. The 
kitchen features stainless steel appliances, laminate countertops, and an open layout with 
an island.” 
 THIS BISHOP HOUSE. “This house is X square feet and has Y bedrooms. The 
kitchen features stainless steel appliances, granite countertops, and an open layout with 
an island.” 
 DIFFERENCES DEPENDING ON HOUSE PREFERENCE. Here, X and Y 
depended on the house size preferences that the participant previously selected. When 
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participants indicated preference for a small house, the Rose House was 1450 square feet 
and three bedrooms, while the Bishop House was 1200 square feet and three bedrooms. 
When preference for a mid size home was selected, the Rose House was 2350 square feet 
and four bedrooms, while the Bishop House was 2100 square feet and four bedrooms. 
When a larger house was preferred, the Rose House was 2950 square feet and 5 
bedrooms, while the Bishop House was 2700 square feet and 5 bedrooms.  
DECISION TIMING 
 Participants were first informed “You may make an offer on one of these houses 
immediately or choose to delay making an offer. If you delay making an offer, you will 
be able to look at more houses. While you are looking at additional houses, these houses 
may be sold.” On a seven-point Likert scale, participants rated their willingness for the 
following question: “How willing would you be to delay making an offer on one of these 
houses?”On a seven-point Likert scale, participants rated their willingness for the 
following question: “How willing would you be to make an offer on one of these houses 
immediately?”After indicating their willingness to delay making an offer and willingness 
to make an offer immediately, participants then choose if they wanted to make an offer on 
a house immediately or delay making an offer and look at more houses. 
FUTURE AND PRESENT ORIENTATION 
 To measure participant's time orientation, they were given eight different 
renovations to make on the house they selected, and asked to rate the attractiveness of 
each on a seven-point Likert scale. Four of the renovations were more future oriented and 
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included cues of longevity and build quality, though they were limited in scope. Four of 
the renovations were more present oriented and larger in scope, though only used mid-
grade materials or did not last as long. The options included the following choices:  
 • Repaint the living room and kitchen with inexpensive, mid-grade paint that lasts 
3-5 years before needing retouching 
 • Repaint the kitchen with high-end custom paint that resists stains and lasts 8-10 
years before needing retouching,  
 • Renovate all the bathrooms with mid-grade materials  
  •Renovate the master bathroom with the highest quality materials  
 • an entire living room set from Ikea  
 • a high-end sofa from Herman Miller  
 • Replace the carpet in the master bedroom with natural, solid hardwood. Solid 
hardwood flooring is milled from a single 3/4" piece of hardwood. It can be sanded and 
refinished over several generations of use.  
 • Replace the carpet in all of the bedrooms with faux wood floor paneling. Faux 
wood is manufactured by pressing layers of composite wood together at high 
temperatures. Though durable, faux wood cannot be refinished and has to be replaced if 
worn or blemished. 
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POST-CHOICE SATISFACTION 
 To measure post-choice satisfaction, participants were asked to rate the following 
on a seven-point Likert scale: “How satisfied are you with the offer you have made?” 
“How confident are you that you made the right choice about which house to make an 
offer on?” “How much do you like the house you made an offer on?” “How strong is 
your preference for this house?” and “How similar is this house to your ideal house?” 
TIME PREFERENCE 
 To assess whether the effects of the manipulations lasted and generalized beyond 
the specific context of house hunting, this study included a previously-validated measure 
of time preference (Weber, Johnson, Milch, Chang, Brodscholl, & Goldstein, 2007). 
Though temporal discounting has been described as a trait-level construct, several studies 
in the past decade have demonstrated that discount rates and discount factors are sensitive 
and susceptible to experimental manipulations (e.g., Bartels & Urminsky, 2011; Wilson & 
Daly, 2004; and Joshi & Fast, 2013). As such, we would expect this measure of time 
preference to be similarly influenced by our manipulations. Because our pilot testing 
revealed an effect of the order participants were told to think about immediate rewards 
and delayed rewards, we included two versions that counterbalanced the order then 
collapsed across them.  
 VERSION A. “Imagine that you are going to be given a $50 Amazon gift card 
(GC) today. You are given the choice of the gift card immediately or a 95% chance of 
receiving a gift card of larger amount 3 months from now. Indicate whether you would 
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prefer a 95% chance for a gift card of each amount listed below to be received 3 months 
from now, or a $50 gift card immediately. For each amount (each row), please select one 
of the two options.” The left side of each row described a 95% chance of receiving a gift 
card of various amounts, ranging from $50-$100 in $5 increments. On the right side was 
the choice to receive the $50 gift card immediately. 
 VERSION B. “Imagine that you are going to be given a $50 Amazon gift card 
(GC) today. You are given the choice of a 95% chance of receiving a gift card of larger 
amount 3 months from now, or of the gift card immediately. Indicate whether you would 
prefer the $50 gift card immediately or a 95% chance for a gift card of each amount listed 
below to be received 3 months from now. For each amount (each row), please select one 
of the two options.” The left side of each row was the choice to receive the $50 gift card 
immediately, while the right side of each row described a 95% chance of receiving a gift 






Zero-order correlations, means, and standard deviations for continuous decision 
strategy measures.
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 M SD
1. Delay – 4.72 1.18
2. Future Ren -.12* – 5.10 1.03
3. Immediate -.36*** .18** – 4.86 1.18
4. Present Ren -.07 -.04 -.02 – 3.93 1.08
5. Discounting .04 -.04 .08 .04 – 5.45 2.54
6. PCS -.15* .27*** .46*** .07 .02 5.19 .88
Note: Delay = willingness to delay making an offer; Future Ren = average ratings of future-oriented 
renovations; Immediate = willingness to choose immediately; Present Ren = average ratings of present-
oriented renovations; Discounting = time preference measure; PCS = post-choice satisfaction. For 
correlations with Discounting, N = 220; for all other correlations, N = 259. 
* p < .05, ** p < . 01, *** p < .001.
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Table 1a 
Zero-order correlations, means, and standard deviations for continuous decision 
strategy measures. 
Condition: Stable Market x Control Comparison
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 M SD
1. Delay – 4.89 1.01
2. Future Ren -.190 – 5.06 1.03
3. Immediate -.32** .15 – 4.53 1.24
4. Present Ren -.08 -.04 -.12 – 4.04 1.06
5. Discounting -.03 -.13 .00 .13 – 5.26 2.78
6. PCS -.18 .31* .30* .11 -.14 4.97 .86
Note: Delay = willingness to delay making an offer; Future Ren = average ratings of future-oriented 
renovations; Immediate = willingness to choose immediately; Present Ren = average ratings of present-
oriented renovations; Discounting = time preference measure; PCS = post-choice satisfaction. For 
correlations with Discounting, N = 55; for all other correlations, N = 66. 
* p < .05, ** p < . 01.
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Table 1b 
Zero-order correlations, means, and standard deviations for continuous decision 
strategy measures. 
Condition: Stable Market x Ideal Comparison
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 M SD
1. Delay – 4.95 1.21
2. Future Ren -.01 – 5.09 1.01
3. Immediate -.26* .18 – 5.15 1.06
4. Present Ren -.15 .07 -.03 – 3.83 1.08
5. Discounting -.02 -.22 -.02 -.30* – 5.78 2.37
6. PCS -.06 .22 .50** .15 .05 5.37 .85
Note: Delay = willingness to delay making an offer; Future Ren = average ratings of future-oriented 
renovations; Immediate = willingness to choose immediately; Present Ren = average ratings of present-
oriented renovations; Discounting = time preference measure; PCS = post-choice satisfaction. For 
correlations with Discounting, N = 55; for all other correlations, N = 66. 
* p < .05, ** p < . 01.
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Table 1c
Zero-order correlations, means, and standard deviations for continuous decision 
strategy measures. 
Condition: Seller’s Market x Control Comparison
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 M SD
1. Delay – 4.61 1.28
2. Future Ren -.16 – 4.95 1.08
3. Immediate -.44** .13 – 4.75 1.26
4. Present Ren -.11 -.12 .06 – 3.88 1.07
5. Discounting .08 .11 .163 .16 – 5.33 2.57
6. PCS -.26* .24 .51** -.06 -.02 5.08 1.00
Note: Delay = willingness to delay making an offer; Future Ren = average ratings of future-oriented 
renovations; Immediate = willingness to choose immediately; Present Ren = average ratings of present-
oriented renovations; Discounting = time preference measure; PCS = post-choice satisfaction. For 
correlations with Discounting, N = 55; for all other correlations, N = 66. 
* p < .05, ** p < . 01.
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Table 1d 
Zero-order correlations, means, and standard deviations for continuous decision 
strategy measures. 
Condition: Seller’s Market x Ideal Comparison
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 M SD
1. Delay – 4.41 1.16
2. Future Ren -.10 – 5.30 .99
3. Immediate -.44** .27* – 5.00 1.08
4. Present Ren .05 -.06 .02 – 3.95 1.12
5. Discounting .10 .05 .11 .13 – 5.42 2.42
6. PCS -.07 .29* .47** .14 .20 5.35 .77
Note: Delay = willingness to delay making an offer; Future Ren = average ratings of future-oriented 
renovations; Immediate = willingness to choose immediately; Present Ren = average ratings of present-
oriented renovations; Discounting = time preference measure; PCS = post-choice satisfaction. For 
correlations with Discounting, N = 55; for all other correlations, N = 66. 
* p < .05, ** p < . 01.
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Table 2






1. Willingness to delay 
making an offer
F(1, 255) 8.23 .22 .79
p .004 .64 .38
η2p .031 .001 .003
2. Willingness to make 
offer immediately
F(1, 255) .06 9.01 1.69
p .80 .003 .20
η2p < .001 .034 .007
3. Ratings of future-
oriented renovations 
F .16 2.25 1.59
p .69 .14 .21
η2p .001 .009 .006
4. Ratings of present-
oriented renovations 
F(1, 255) .01 .28 1.15
p .91 .60 .29
η2p < .001 .001 .004
5. Time Preference F(1, 216) .18 .78 .41
p .67 .38 .52
η2p .001 .004 .002
6. Post-choice 
satisfaction
F(1, 255) .20 9.58 .38
p .65 .002 .54
η2p .001 .036 .001
Note: Significant effects are bolded.
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Table 3




Stable Market Control 
(No Target)
Ideal Target
1. Willingness to 
delay making an offer
4.51 (1.22) 4.92 (1.11) 4.76 (1.15) 4.68 (1.21)
2. Willingness to 
make offer 
immediately
4.88 (1.17) 4.84 (1.19) 4.63 (1.25) 5.08 (1.07)
3. Ratings of future-
oriented renovations 
5.13 (1.05) 5.07 (1.01) 5.00 (1.05) 5.19 (1.00)
4. Ratings of present-
oriented renovations 
3.92 (1.10) 3.94 (1.07) 3.96 (1.07) 3.89 (1.10)
5. Time Preference 5.37 (2.49) 5.51 (2.59) 5.29 (2.67) 5.60 (2.39)
6. Post-choice 
satisfaction
5.22 (.89) 5.17 (.87) 5.02 (.93) 5.36 (.81)




Zero-order correlations of continuous decision strategy measures with overall SES.
Measure Delay FutureRen Immediate PresentRen Discounting PCS
Childhood SES -.10 .29*** .07 -.09 -.10 .18**
Current/Future 
SES
-.09 .19** .12 † .02 -.17* .21**
Overall SES -.11 † .28*** .11 † -.04 -.16** .23***
Note: Delay = willingness to delay making an offer; Future Ren = average ratings of future-oriented 
renovations; Immediate = willingness to choose immediately; Present Ren = average ratings of present-
oriented renovations; Discounting = time preference measure; PCS = post-choice satisfaction. For 
correlations with Discounting, N = 220; for all other correlations, N = 259. 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < . 01, *** p < .001.
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Table 5
Simple Slope Analysis of Three-way Interaction Among Target, Market, and Overall SES 
to Affect Willingness to Choose Immediately 
Slope Location Effect β t p
One standard deviation 
below the mean of overall 
SES
Target -.08 -.05 .96
Market -.65 -2.34 .02
SES -.08 -.61 .54
Target*Market .96 2.34 .02
Target*SES .23 1.20 .23
Market*SES .43 2.25 .03
At the mean of overall 
SES
Target .23 1.11 .27
Market -.19 -.92 .36
SES -.08 -.61 .54
Target*Market .37 1.27 .21
Target*SES .23 1.20 .23
Market*SES .43 2.25 .03
One standard deviation 
above the mean of overall 
SES
Target .48 1.66 .099
Market .27 .90 .37
SES -.08 -.61 .54
Target*Market -.22 -.54 .59
Target*SES .23 1.20 .23
Market*SES .43 2.25 .03
Note: All continuous predictors centered. Significant effects bolded. 
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Figure 1: The Effect of Market Condition and Comparison Target on Willingness to 
Delay 
 Though the two factors did not interact, and the main effect of Comparison Target 
was nonsignificant, there was a main effect of Market Condition such that participants in 
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Figure 2: The Effect of Market Condition and Comparison Target on Willingness to Make 
Offer Immediately 
 The interaction of the two factors was nonsignificant, as was the main effect of 
Market Condition. There was, however, a main effect of Comparison Target, such that 
participants who pictured their ideal were more willing to make an offer immediately 
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Figure 3: The Effect of Market Condition and Comparison Target on Future Orientation 
 The two manipulations did not affect future orientation and did not interact to 
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Figure 4: The Effect of Market Condition and Comparison Target on Present Orientation  
 The two manipulations did not affect present orientation and did not interact to 
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Figure 5: The Effect of Market Condition and Comparison Target on Time Preference 
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Figure 6: The Effect of Market Condition and Comparison Target on Post-Choice 
Satisfaction 
 There was a main effect of Comparison Target, such that participants who 
pictured their ideal were more satisfied with their chosen house than did participants in 
the control condition. There was no main effect of Market Condition, and the interaction 
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Figure 7: Effect of Market Condition on Decision to Make Offer Immediately or Delay 
 Market Condition had a significant effect on offer timing choice, 𝜒2(1, N = 259) = 
6.64, p = .01, such that a greater proportion of participants chose to delay in the stable 
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Figure 8: Effect of Comparison Target on Decision to Make Offer Immediately or Delay 
 Comparison Target had a significant effect on offer timing choice, 𝜒2(1, N = 259) 
= 8.44, p = .004, such that a greater proportion chose to delay in the control condition 




































Figure 9: Effect of Market Condition on House Choice 
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Figure 10. Effect of Comparison Target on House Choice 
 Comparison Target had a marginally significant effect on house choice, 𝜒2(1, N = 
259) = 3.52, p = .057, such that a greater proportion chose the Bishop House, the house 


































Rose House Bishop House Rose House Bishop House
8466 4861
!68
 Figure 11. Overall SES Moderates Effect of Target on Time Preference 
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 Figure 12. Three-way Interaction Among Overall SES, Market, and Target to Influence 
Willingness to Choose Immediately 
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On 4/24/2014 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:
Type of Review: Initial Study







Documents Reviewed: • Consent RMA.pdf, Category: Consent Form;
• IRB RMA Masters.docx, Category: IRB Protocol;
• Masters Measures 4.24.pdf, Category: Measures 
(Survey questions/Interview questions /interview 
guides/focus group questions);
• Diestelmeier Human Subjects Training 1, Category: 
Other (to reflect anything not captured above);
• Diestelmeier Human Subjects Training 2, Category: 
Other (to reflect anything not captured above);
• Recruiting RMA.pdf, Category: Recruitment 
Materials;
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 4/24/2014. 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).
